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ABSTRACT
We start from, and expand on, a basic insight in negative dialectic,
namely, that our main concern should be with the absolute worst
in political life. We then consider how this might have an impact
on the way we understand the role and grounds of moral equality.
Subsequently, we move on to explain the importance of decency
in political morality. Finally, we take a closer look to basic data
about global poverty and inequality and what these might tell us
in light of our analysis of the foundations of moral equality and its
relationship to social cruelty.
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‘We may not know what absolute good is or the absolute norm, we may not even know what man is or the human or
humanity – but what the inhuman is we know very well indeed. I would say that the place of moral philosophy today lies more
in the concrete denunciation of the inhuman, than in vague and abstract attempts to situate man in his existence.’ (Adorno,
Problems of Moral Philosophy)
In Memory of David Held
This paper is a revised version of the work David and I intended to pursue on a Critical Theory of the global order. We discussed
the intellectual bases of the essay, and traded draft material, until a few weeks before his untimely death on March the 2nd
2019. No doubt, the ﬁnal result of our work would have been very diﬀerent, and much improved, had our conversation not
been interrupted so abruptly. David was a friend and a mentor to me, so I would like to take the opportunity to say a few
words about him.
David was not the typical academic. Of late, academic life has become increasingly specialized. Instead, David’s contribu-
tions addressed the big picture. His major works included one of the ﬁnest reconstructions of the tradition of Critical
Theory, an intellectual history of the idea of democracy from ancient Greece to present days, an account of the meaning
and impact of globalization and cosmopolitanism, and one of the ﬁrst signiﬁcant explorations of the relationship between
the modern state, global politics and democratic rule beyond borders. Another feature of modern academia is the extent
to which professional debates often dictate intellectual trends. For David, instead, professional debates were largely
instrumental. He was, self-consciously, a public intellectual, and the development of his ideas was naturally guided by the
desire to address real political issues. As a political theorist David was concerned with how the world should be, not just
with how the world is. And yet, he believed that we should never sever the link between the positive and the normative
aspects of political life. David was also atypical in another respect. He was a brilliant and proliﬁc writer. He was wonderful
teacher and mentor to scores of graduate students from all over the world. But he was also a real entrepreneur. He co-
founded Polity Press in 1984. He was one of the founding editors of the journal Global Policy. He developed countless
public lecture series (most recently, the Castle Lectures at Durham University) and several degree programmes and
research institutes (his most recent ones: the MSc Global Politics and the Global Policy Institute, both at Durham
University). He was, in a nutshell, creative beyond the remit of ideas and publications.
Finally, allow me to strike a more personal note. As I mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph, David was
a mentor and a friend. My gratitude for his support over the years is truly hard to express in words. I left my country
(Italy) aged 24 and with no clear road ahead of me, certainly not one that lead to an academic career. Once I started
thinking about an academic career, the odds of starting such career in a favourable way seemed to be small. My
doubts kept on growing stronger living through the ‘privileged hardship’ that writing a thesis often involves. David’s
support was unﬂinching and invaluable all along. The only thing left to say is, I think, ‘thank you, David’.
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Introduction
We live in a world where poverty is still a widespread source of misery, broken lives and
ultimately death. We also live in a very unequal world – one in which disparities of wealth
and income are staggering. In this essay we would like to bring to bear some of the insights
of Critical Theory broadly construed on these aforementioned facts. 1 Since Critical Theory
is a broad and complex church, it might be worth saying something more about which
speciﬁc aspect of it we intend to draw upon. Our starting point is a capacious interpretation
of Adorno’s idea of a negative dialectics. Negative dialectics is understood, for the purposes
of this essay, as a commitment to the avoidance of certainmoral bads. Our interpretation of
negative dialectics is capacious since, contrary to the traditional understanding of the idea,
we tend to think that it can oﬀer a more positive account of what to aim for; one that is not
limited to the desire to avoid what is, morally, the absolute worst (see Freyenhagen 2013).
To understand the importance of negative dialectics it is helpful to contrast it with some of
the more mainstream approaches that have dominated political and moral philosophy in
recent decades. These approaches are, in our view, deeply attractive given the kind of picture
of ideal political societies that they oﬀer; our purpose in oﬀering this contrast is not to detract
from them in absolute terms. Rather, we wish to underline how these approaches are diﬀerent
fromwhat we are attempting here. Liberal egalitarian approaches often start from some form
of commitment to the moral equality of all human beings. Furthermore, they tend to explain
the idea of moral equality in terms of dignity or in terms of the possession of certain positive
characteristics on the part of all human beings (e.g. rational agency, see Griﬃn 2008; see also
Forst 2017, 2018). Second, these approaches have often seen justice as the main object of
concern for political morality. That is, they tend to portray justice, as Rawls famously argued,
as the ﬁrst virtue of social and political institutions ([1971] 1999, 3).
In the approach we take in this essay, we will attempt to oﬀer an alternative narrative,
one that sees the basic commitments to moral equality we have as grounded in human
vulnerability, rather than dignity or rational agency (see Sangiovanni 2017). Furthermore,
we shall argue that the ﬁrst virtue of social and political institutions is decency, not justice,
and that the principal objective of political practice is the avoidance of indecency, that is, of
the indecent treatment of the living.
Adorno famously argued that our new categorical imperative was to avoid a second
Auschwitz. This certainly is a stark way to explain the contrast between the traditional
Kantian view and the idea of negative dialectics, between the ‘fact of reason’ and the ‘fact of
unreason’, or suﬀering in all its forms. Expanding the latter insight further than Adorno’s
initial statement we can claim that the primary task of a Critical Theory of the global order
is to ﬁnd a compelling set of moral and political ideas to ground our negative judgement
concerning the current state of the global political domain. These moral and political ideas
will, however, diﬀer from the standard liberal egalitarian accounts. Unlike most liberal
egalitarian accounts, the core of our proposal lies in the things we should try to avoid rather
than the ideals we should strive for; in what is most urgent for us to achieve rather than in
what we should ideally achieve. As Adorno wrote, ‘no recollection of transcendence is
possible any more, save by way of perdition; eternity appears, not as such, but diﬀracted
through the most perishable’ (1973, 360).
1We are, needless to say, not the ﬁrst authors to attempt to approach global politics form a critical perspective. For
a locus classicus see Andrew Linklater’s Critical Theory and World Politics (2007).
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Adorno would certainly suggest that the main fault with liberal egalitarian approaches
is that they take for granted something that should not be taken for granted, namely, that
we can even begin to think about what morality requires of us in the broken world we
presently inhabit. We partly disagree. In our view, Adorno puts the contrast too starkly.
A crucial source of his reﬂections is the catastrophic impact of the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century on our capacity to imagine and achieve a better world. We are required
to think and act to ensure that such atrocities could not happen again (1973, 365). At the
same time, Adorno believes, philosophy must not simply validate particular utopian
aspirations or pathways forward since such validation can undermine the need for
relentless critique and struggle for change (Lambert 2015; Held 1980, ch.7).
Contrary to this view, we think a more capacious version of negative dialectics can
both focus on the avoidance of certain key bads and yet, at the same time, oﬀer more
positive guidance when it comes to the goals that social and political institutions should
aim for. However, and precisely because those bads are central to the overall picture, they
will inﬂuence the nature of the goals that social and political institutions are required to
pursue. At the very least, they will oﬀer us a diﬀerent understanding of what grounds
some of these goals and of their relative urgency or claim to priority. In opposition to
Adorno, whose focus throughout his life was the immediate trauma of Nazism and the
negative dialectics of political struggle, the focus here is on the socio-economic conditions
that empower, erode or destroy the basic life chances of all.
Moral equality: from dignity to cruelty
Moral equality is the cornerstone of contemporary liberalism. In a celebrated passage,
RonaldDworkin oncewrote that all contemporary political philosophy rested on egalitarian
foundations (1986, 296–7). The idea ofmoral equality, inDworkin’s ownwords, provided ‘a
kind of plateau in political argument’ (1983, 25). Why should we accept the idea of moral
equality? The canonical answer is that moral equality is an articulation, or a codiﬁcation, of
the recognition of human dignity. The latter is a powerful story. Dignity is what philoso-
phers call a status concept. The very word ‘dignity’ originates from the Latin word ‘dignus’
often translated as ‘worthy’. The basic claims of dignitarian accounts is then that, simply put,
we are all worth it. In fact, we are all equally worth it. The equalmoral standing of all human
beings is the aﬃrmation of a particular status; the status of having moral worth and
possessing it equally.
One may pause and ask: in virtue of what do we possess this equal moral worth? Of
course, this might simply prove to be, paraphrasing Bernard Williams, ‘one thought too
many’ (1981). In the end all moral systems need axioms, and axioms, by deﬁnition,
cannot be proven. Yet, things are not that simple. The basic reason is that the main
feature of axioms is, usually, that they are self-evidently true, not self-evidently con-
troversial. However, the latter does not seem to apply to the idea of moral equality. As
soon as a form of ‘human equality’ is aﬃrmed one is immediately compelled to ask in
virtue of what the claim can be sustained. ‘In virtue of what property are human beings
considered morally equal?’ thus seems a legitimate question to ask. And this is where
perplexities about the truth of the axiom soon emerge, since one of the most powerful
elements of our experience is how diverse people are. Numerous solutions to this
problem have been proposed over the past ﬁfty years.
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Perhaps themost ingenious, is Rawls’ approach inATheory of Justice (Rawls [1971] 1999).
There, Rawls claimed that we are not morally equal in virtue of our equal possession of
a given ‘ﬁrst order’ property (e.g. rational agency, moral strength, intelligence), but rather, we
are morally equal in virtue of our possession of a ‘supervenient’ property. Such supervenient
property individuates the relevant range to which the value of an agent’s (relevant) ﬁrst order
property should belong. To illustrate, intelligence is a scalar property that clearly comes in
degrees. If intelligence were to be the basis of moral equality, the problem of variation would
loom large, for human beings are emphatically not all equally intelligent. Yet, we might
develop the following non-scalar, or range, property: that one’s intelligence falls within
a speciﬁed range. Any person whose intelligence falls within that range would, then, display
the range property equally.
It is clearly true that whether you are in Sunderland, close to the Scottish border, or in
Birmingham, you are equally in the UK. The issue, however, is why we should care about
range properties when they are applied not to things such as geographical locations and
jurisdictional separations, but to the moral and intellectual qualities of human beings. In
other words, the problem with this kind of approach, as Ian Carter (2011) has authorita-
tively argued, is that unless we have some independent justiﬁcation to value the range
property, we are entitled to ask: why should we care about it rather than about the scalar
property over which the range property ‘supervenes’? To illustrate, why should one care,
normatively speaking, that a person’s intelligence lies within a range instead of just caring
about the intelligence itself? The impression is that Rawls is replacing something we
normally care about, but that is subject to the problem of variation, with something that
isn’t normally our primary concern, the range property, precisely because it is not subject to
the problem of variation.
We shall not address the ﬁner points of that debate here, but we would like to contend
that, given the controversial nature of the standardly accepted justiﬁcations for moral
equality within the cosmopolitan camp, it would be worth widening the approach by
considering an alternative proposal. This proposal has a long and distinguished pedigree
yet it has been (comparatively) neglected of late. This is the tradition of what we can call,
with Judith Shklar (1982), negative egalitarianism. Negative egalitarianism has been
recently revitalized by Andrea Sangiovanni (2017). His powerful and brilliantly defended
argument in Humanity without Dignity is that dignity, either secularly or religiously
understood, is not the right basis for moral equality. Instead, we should start from the
wrongness of speciﬁc forms of treating others as morally inferior. Treating someone as
morally inferior involves wrongful stigmatization, dehumanization, infantilization, instru-
mentalization or objectiﬁcation. Sangiovanni’s account is complex and cleverly con-
structed, yet the core of its message is simply that we should change perspective in our
thinking about moral equality. It is the badness of certain forms of ‘morally inferiorizing’
treatment that best explains our commitment to moral equality. Put diﬀerently, it is
precisely by exploring the badness of speciﬁc forms of unequal treatment that we can
ground a commitment to moral equality. If negative egalitarianism had to be captured in
a slogan, the slogan would be ‘inequality ﬁrst’; for it is by understanding how bad some
forms of unequal treatment can be that we can fully understand why a commitment to
moral equality is so important.
Sangiovanni goes on to claim that what is common to the relevant forms of inferiorizing
treatment is what he calls their social cruelty (2017, 75). At the most abstract level,
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according to Sangiovanni, cruelty always involves ‘the unauthorized and wrongful use of
another’s vulnerability to cause severe harm or suﬀering’ (2017, 75). Yet his primary
concern is a narrower account of cruelty, one that focuses more directly on human beings
as social and political creatures. Sangiovanni calls the latter social cruelty and deﬁnes it as
follows:
“ … social cruelty, involves the unauthorized, harmful, and wrongful use of another’s
vulnerability to attack or obliterate their capacity to develop and maintain an integral
sense of self.” (Sangiovanni 2017, 76).
Three comments are in order concerning Sangiovanni’s approach, his understanding of
cruelty, and its relationship withmoral equality. The ﬁrst is that, following Sangiovanni, our
conception of moral equality, and perhaps even more ambitiously of what grounds moral
status, changes. The central feature of human beings is not the possession of a given status-
conferring property, but rather, their vulnerability. The centrality of vulnerability to the
human condition is worth emphasizing. Both the Aristotelian and the Utilitarian traditions
have, in their own peculiar ways, stressed the importance that vulnerability should play in
understanding the appropriate source of moral concern for sentient beings (Singer 1979)
and the nature of the good life (Nussbaum 1986). What seems less frequent and much less
explored is the relevance that the idea can play within a broadly Kantian framework, such as
the one developed by Sangiovanni. The second comment concerns the very deﬁnition of
cruelty that Sangiovanni puts forward. The comment equally applies to both the broad and
to the narrow deﬁnitions. The basic point is that the deﬁnitions do not easily lend
themselves to portray the relevance that indiﬀerence can have to some forms of cruelty.
We shall havemore to say about this in the following sections, but the essence is that cruelty
can be a moral crime of omission not just commission. The language used by Sangiovanni
may suggest otherwise (but see Sangiovanni 2017, ch., 3). Yet, arguably, one of the most
common forms of cruelty is an agent’s indiﬀerence to the plight of another. Finally, note
that it is when cruelty is invoked as a category within social and political life that Shklar’s
liberalism of fear (1989) meets our understanding of negative dialectics: by paying attention
to cruelty we will start to build our normative theorizing fromwhat we think wemust avoid
at all cost, rather than what we think is ideal or worth pursuing.
Allow us to highlight in what sense the badness of some forms of unequal treatment
can lead us, so to speak, to moral equality. Here too, we shall follow Andrea Sangiovanni.
According to Sangiovanni our ‘(…) status as moral equals (…) is composed of the
distinctive set of moral rights that protects us from being treated as inferior’ (2017,
p. 101, emphasis added). And the rights that are constitutive of this equal moral status
are rights to equal treatment for they are rights that protect us against speciﬁc forms of
inferiorizing treatment (i.e. those forms instantiated by social cruelty). Put diﬀerently,
moral equality is still centre stage in this kind of account, but simply not for the reasons
we are used to see it as the beacon of our moral thinking. We do not, in this picture, start
from something human beings possess equally and is worth protecting. Rather, we start
from their vulnerability, and from the ways in which it might be exploited and/or
neglected by socially cruel forms of treatment. We then portray our moral status as
a bundle of moral rights that protect our interests in not being treated in a (socially) cruel
way. And, to repeat, this moral status is a status as moral equals in the peculiar sense that
the bundle of moral rights that constitute it are rights against inferiorizing treatment by
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others, be them natural or artiﬁcial persons. In this picture, then, moral equality is not
part of our axioms but is explained in terms of our refusal of social cruelty. Moral equality
is thus still central in this kind of moral system, and yet it is a derivative notion, not
a primitive one:
“Our commitment to moral equality therefore is both grounded in and constituted by our
rejection of inequality. It is for this reason (…) that inequality is prior to equality. It is
prior, more precisely, in two senses. First, equal moral status is constituted by or consists
in a bundle of rights against certain kinds of inferiorizing treatment (rather than the other
way around), and, second, our commitment to moral equality is explained by or grounded
in the rejection of inferiorizing treatment as socially cruel (rather than the other way
around).” (Sangivoanni, 2017, 103).
Political morality: beyond justice?
Let us take stock. Human beings are morally equal. Their moral equality is not, however,
to be found in the possession of a given property or set of properties that they possess
equally. Rather, it is derived from their shared vulnerabilities and the risk that such
vulnerabilities will be exploited and/or neglected by other human beings (individually or
collectively). This approach, in our view, provides the basis for an attractive account of
moral equality. Yet, as it stands, this account is too abstract. Human lives are not
conducted in a vacuum. Human beings relate to each other in the context of social and
political life and their interactions are mediated by the work of social, political and
economic institutions. It thus seems crucial to understand what shape those institutions
should take. That is, what form such institutions should take in order to be compatible
with the protection of the equal moral status of all those who live under them.
Put diﬀerently, what kinds of institutions are congruent with a recognition of the
moral equality of all? The question, it has to be stressed, is not one of straightforward
‘derivation’. In other words, it is not the case that we are oﬀering an airtight argument to
the eﬀect that moral equality ‘entails’ features X or Y in a political context. Rather, the
point is to think about what features, at a minimum, a social and political system should
display for us to be believe that it is compatible with respecting the value of equal moral
status, and thus with the eﬀective prevention of social cruelty.
It would be tempting to simply argue that those institutions should be ‘just’, that they
should show equal respect and concern for all, that they should guarantee equal liberal
rights, and perhaps add that they should be egalitarian in the way they assign the beneﬁts
and burdens of social cooperation, including resources and/or welfare and/or opportu-
nities. However, our sense is that this answer would be at the very least incomplete. We
cannot hope to oﬀer conclusive arguments in support of this view. Instead, our aim is to
suggest initial reasons that might push one to be sceptical about the role of justice in this
particular context. Why? First, because the derivation of institutional and distributive
commitments from an account of moral equality has proven to be very controversial. If
ﬁve decades of debates between liberal egalitarians and libertarians have taught us
nothing else, they have certainly allowed us to see that going from some form of basic
moral equality to a speciﬁc set of entitlements is not an easy task. Reasonable disagree-
ment about what justice requires is clearly not something we should be concerned about
in the abstract, but if the goal is to establish the institutional requirements that a system of
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institutions should display in order to avoid social cruelty, then, one might expect more
convergence.
Second, because we believe that moral equality is compatible with a wider set of institu-
tional and political arrangements. The class of social systems that are congruent with the
demands of moral equality is wider than the class of social systems that are justly organized.
This may sound counterintuitive, but looking beyond the conﬁnes of Western societies, one
would be hard pressed to argue, that the only permissible approach to organize social and
political institutions in ways that are congruent with moral equality is a broadly liberal one.
To illustrate, Singapore is certainly not a liberal society. And one can convincingly argue that
it is not a just one, for that reason. But it is not at all self-evident that this allows us to conclude
that it violates the requirements imposed on social and political institutions by the idea of
moral equality. And, we should add, this is especially the case if we consider that the
underlying rationale for protecting equalmoral status is captured by our rejection of wrongful
forms of inferiorizing treatment.
Third, because we are sceptical about the relative impoverishment of our normative
language that might undergird the temptation to ‘reach for justice’ as soon and as quickly as
possible (Kukathas 2018; Tomasi 2001). Social arrangements might be just or unjust, but they
might also be good or bad, conducive to virtue or not, legitimate or illegitimate, and, as we
shall argue, decent or indecent. The latter point is worth stressing. For it is certainly possible to
argue that diﬀerent kinds of institutional systems are further away or closer to what justice
(however deﬁned) requires. To illustrate, and barring problems of classiﬁcation, it is certainly
possible to compare diﬀerent existing political communities as more or less just, based on
a speciﬁcation of the meaning of justice (see Doyle 2006; see also Coakley and Maﬀettone
2016). The point is, in our view, slightlymore subtle, and pertains towhether itmakes sense to
claim that the only (or even the most salient) judgement we can oﬀer whenever we examine
a system of institutions is its ‘distance’ from a single benchmark. We think not, for we are
inclined to believe that even when it comes to concepts in political morality, some version of
value pluralism applies (see Mason 2018). There might not be a ‘mastervalue’ in political
morality. And if that is the case, one should invoke an aspect of political morality to assess
institutions in light of what one believes the evaluation to be for.
Some would object that the latter idea is incompatible with much of recent liberal
political philosophy. Many would instinctively cite Rawls’ opening statement in A Theory
of Justice; the idea that ‘Justice is the ﬁrst virtue of social institutions’ ([1971] 1999).
However, we would argue that while the above statement has undeniable appeal, it is
open to interpretation. Declaring justice to be the ‘ﬁrst virtue’ of social institutions is
ambiguous: ‘ﬁrst virtue’ could stand for ‘most important’ or for ‘most urgent’. Put diﬀer-
ently, to state that X is the ﬁrst virtue of agents of the kind Y does not clarify whether X is
the most important virtue that agents of the kind Y should display or, alternatively, whether
X is the one virtue that agents of the kind Y are requiredmost urgently to display given facts
about the world as we know it. In our view, it is not implausible to think that: a) the most
important obligations of an agent are connected to one’s understanding of the nature of the
agent in question (see James 2005); while at the same time believing that b) judgements
about the relative urgency of the duties and obligations that apply to the agent depend on
the connection between the agent’s nature and the structural conditions of the environment
in which the agent is placed. And, in the world as it is, the greatest moral tragedy we witness
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is not that many if not most do not live within the bounds of just liberal institutions, but
rather, that most are not protected from social cruelty.
Here, the reader is entitled to ask what place would justice occupy in the kind of view
that we are presenting. She might be worried, in other words, that we are discounting the
value of justice altogether.We disagree. Justice is still, in our view, a central value in political
morality. Instead, our claim is more modest. We argue that justice is not the only value in
political morality, and that there are thus other such values. And if one believes some form
of value pluralism to apply, then, it is not obvious that one can rank, or commensurate such
values. Thus, our account simply does not address the question of what justice is or requires
of us, nor, to be clear, it discounts the value of pursuing justice.
To reiterate and expand on a point that we have expressed above, which value we
take to be salient will depend on the circumstances in which we ﬁnd ourselves and on
the features of the system of institutions we are trying to assess. Consider a country like
North Korea. Clearly enough North Korea is not a just system of institutions. Nor can
we plausibly claim that the way power is exercised by the government over its citizens is
legitimate, or that it allows them to lead a good or virtuous life etc. And yet one might
be tempted to argue, as we are, that there is something even more fundamentally wrong
with how the basic structure of North Korean institutions treat its citizens. Such
treatment is so appalling, so ‘socially cruel’, that one might feel that the label ‘unjust’,
for example, might not fully capture what is at stake, from the point of view of political
morality. For imagine that we consider justice to be the understood in terms of the
bundle of rights that is familiar from the liberal constitutional tradition, then, it would
seem at least to us, that the main concern we have with North Korean institutions is not
that they are simply unjust. To reiterate, the point is emphatically not to absolve North
Korean institutions. Quite the opposite in fact. The point is that their moral assessment
calls into question aspects of human life in political society that are even more pressing,
and thus reveals problems that are even more fundamental.
Decency, basic rights and reconciliation
Let us take stock and reiterate the argument so far. We started by suggesting that moral
equality is central to our approach, but that it should be understood through the lenses of
negative egalitarianism. Put diﬀerently, moral equality can be understood as a status char-
acterized by a set or bundle of moral rights and such rights are individuated as the ones that
would protect persons from social cruelty (i.e. protect them from speciﬁc forms of inferioriz-
ing treatment). Thus, in the picture we have oﬀered, it is social cruelty and the vulnerability of
human beings that are foundational, while moral equality, while a central ideal, is derivative.
The question might then arise, and it certainly is a question that typically arises within the
conﬁnes of political philosophy, of what kind of social and political arrangements would be
recommended by a negative egalitarian approach. And, given the structure of recent debates
in the discipline, one might very well be tempted to think that the answer lies in a given
(liberal) conception of justice. Without denying that justice is a central political ideal (nor the
considerable attraction of a broadly liberal approach to justice), we have suggested otherwise.
Negatively, we have suggested that, at least insofar as one’s goal is to establish minimal
congruence between a system of political institutions and negative egalitarianism, justice is
not the most salient concept.
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More positively, in this part of the essay, we would like to suggest that decency might
be more salient. The next obvious question would then be what decency stands for. In
this section of the essay we argue for two distinct ideas. First, that the content of
decency, at least if one understands decency the way we do (for clearly, there are other
ways to understand the idea, see below), is given by basic human rights. Second, that
decent institutions recommend a speciﬁc kind of attitude towards them, one that we
shall call ‘weak reconciliation’.
As we have just seen, and as the title of this section suggests, we are inclined to think
that the idea of decency (see Rawls 1999; Margalit 1998) should take centre stage.2 More
precisely, we shall claim that a decent system of institutions is congruent with (or at the
very least not in conﬂict with) the moral equality of persons because, or more speci-
ﬁcally when (at a minimum), it protects them from social cruelty by guaranteeing their
basic human rights. Or, to use the language we have adopted in the previous sections of
the essay, decent institutions and political systems protect the basic interest of human
beings in not seeing their vulnerabilities exploited or neglected and they do so by
protecting their basic human rights (see Sangiovanni 2017).
It is important to clarify why basic rights are central to decency as we have deﬁned it.
The beginning of an answer lies, in our view, in the kind of role or function that rights3
tend to have within our political cultures. And here too, the best way forward is to start
by thinking about what a world without the protection of rights would be like.
According to Joel Feinberg, that kind of world would one in which:
“Persons would no longer hope for decent treatment from others on the ground of desert
or rightful claim. Indeed, they would come to think of themselves as having no special
claim to kindness or consideration from others, so that whenever even minimally decent
treatment is forthcoming they would think themselves lucky rather than inherently deser-
ving, and their benefactors extraordinarily virtuous and worthy of great gratitude.”
(Feinberg 1973, quoted in Shue 1996, 113)”.
Feinberg goes on to state that this kind of world would dramatically damage the self-
esteem of those who are on the receiving end of benevolent treatment, should it be
available. Yet, a slightly diﬀerent interpretation is that a world in which at least some basic
rights are not guaranteed is a world in which the vulnerability of human beings is not
really or convincingly protected from exploitation and/or neglect. For real protection of
a vulnerability, we contend, can only come from a form of reliable assurance that such
vulnerability will not be exploited and/or neglected. And, in the political cultures we now
inhabit, this reliable assurance is usually couched in the language of rights.
Vulnerability, we have claimed, is central to understanding the foundations of moral
equality, and of the human condition more broadly. Thus, vulnerability is not something
we can eliminate. What can be tamed is the extent to which social and political institu-
tions allow, by commission or by omission, that vulnerability to be exploited or neglected.
The question, then, is: what would it take for this not to be the case? And the answer we
suggest is that basic human rights, understood as the stable protection of basic interests
2Our account of decency is indebted to both Rawls’ (1999) and Margalit’s (1998) accounts. Our view of decency is,
however, much more minimal.
3Feinberg concentrates on claim rights because he focuses on their counterpart, directed duties. But we believe the
point he is making has broader signiﬁcance.
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against standard social threats, to borrow Henry Shue’s language (1996), would play an
important part in the answer. Protection against the exploitation or neglect of human
vulnerability is clearly linked to the oﬀer of a reasonable assurance that exploitation or
neglect will not happen.
Perhaps evenmore importantly, it is worth stating the question that decency provides an
answer to in a broader sense. The question is not ‘what world would we like to live in
morally speaking?’, rather, the question is ‘what world could we live with morally speak-
ing?’. That the two questions are diﬀerent is relatively easy to grasp. And yet the importance
of the latter has often been overshadowed by contemporary political philosophy’s attention
to the former. For it is by asking the former that one is naturally led to ideal theories of
social and political institutions. Thinking about ideal theory is not, per se, something that
we wish to criticize. The point is not, then, that we should avoid a certain way of theorizing.
Rather, the point is to consider a diﬀerent purpose for normative theories, namely, the
determination of a self-standing normative benchmark that explains a diﬀerent subset of
our evaluative judgements towards our social and political institutions.
This kind of benchmark, the one provided by decency, is probably closer to a diﬀerent
and well-developed idea in political philosophy, namely, legitimacy. So, it is worth saying
a few words about their relationship. In the current literature there is deep disagreement
concerning both the concept of legitimacy and about the content of the best conception of
legitimacy (see Christiano 2008;; Peter 2008). Yet, it is probably fair to say that most
theorists would coalesce around the idea that legitimacy is to be understood as the right
to rule and that such right is bestowed by democratic forms of governance (but see
Simmons 2001, for a diﬀerent account). Legitimacy and justice are then portrayed as
distinct and yet related, with the former considered as a weaker standard of normative
evaluation: laws and institutions, in this picture, can be legitimate without being just. If
legitimacy is understood in those terms, then, clearly decency as we have deﬁned it is
a much weaker standard; one that is twice removed, so to speak, from justice. Decency is
thus distinct from legitimacy, at least from the standard picture of legitimacy we have
oﬀered, because decency does not mandate the acceptance of a right to rule by institutions,
and because decency requires respect for basic human rights, not democracy.
It is perhaps more diﬃcult to ascertain what legitimacy demands in terms of one’s
attitude towards social and political institutions, and yet, clearly, institutions that have
a right to rule cannot be overthrown, or revolted against. They certainly can be the
object of attempts to reform and substantively change them, and, depending on one’s
role with respect to the institution, even public and vigorous protest may be an option.
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which, despite all their possible faults, legitimate
institutions command some of our support and respect, if not for what they do at
any point in time, at least for what they are and stand for.
What kind of (moral) attitude best captures the relationship between persons and
decent institutions? Our sense is that decent institutions are ones that, as we have
suggested above, we can live with morally speaking. So, negatively, decent institutions,
just like legitimate ones may not be the object of revolution and revolt. Yet, unlike
legitimate institutions, decent institutions are not necessarily ones that claim our
support or respect, even at the very abstract level that a wholistic judgement of an
institution may provide.
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Perhaps the best concept to describe one’s attitude to decent institutions is what we would
call ‘weak reconciliation’. According to Hegel’s political theodicy (see Hardimon 1994)4
human beings are often alienated from their social contexts and political philosophy may
work to provide themwith the tools to assuage their subjective sense of alienation. Alienation
from one’s social world can, however, also be objective insofar as basic social and political
arrangements are inhospitable to persons’ sense of being at home in the social world.
Ultimately, Hegel thought that we could be reconciled, both subjectively and objectively, to
modern basic political institutions, notwithstanding their obvious faults, and the evils, such as
war and especially poverty, that they allowed to occur. Yet such reconciliation is not to be
confusedwith a sense of full acceptance. Reconciliation, at least inHegel’s sense, contains both
an element of aﬃrmation and a deep sense of melancholy. Being reconciled to one’s social
world does not require the construction of a rosy picture of basic political arrangements and it
certainly is not premised on forgetting some of the aforementioned evils that they allow.
In this (very coarse) picture of Hegel’s view, we understand weak reconciliation to be
composed of melancholy for the evils merely decent institutions no doubt are compa-
tible with, and by a diﬀerent and much more minimal sense of endorsement compared
to Hegel’s account of reconciliation. Decent institutions protect the basic human rights
of their subjects and in so doing protect them from social cruelty. That is certainly one
important form of achievement, and yet it is a very partial one. Decent institutions
merely protect us from the moral abyss, they do not allow us to live well or rationally
together. And yet, given that we know that the moral abyss is often a reality of social
life, we may be reconciled to decent institutions in the very limited sense in which one
is reconciled to something one believes he or she ought not to resent.
Global poverty, indiﬀerence and cruelty5
Oncewe raise our gaze from the immediate surroundings oﬀered to (some of) us by advanced
industrialized societies, we ﬁnd a world of immense suﬀering and destitution. Human life, at
least looked at from a global perspective, is a tale of pain and insecurity. And, while it is true
that some progress has been achieved over the past few decades, it seems diﬃcult to be
reconciled, even in theweak sense we have speciﬁed above, to a global order that still allows so
many of our fellow human beings to needlessly suﬀer or die. Stated diﬀerently, we live in
a world where millions live in absolute poverty and where wealth and income inequalities are
staggering. The presence of large disparities in economic wellbeing allows us to point out that
the most important moral feature of the global economic order is its cruelty: the indiﬀerence
it regularly displays for the basic rights to subsistence of some of its weakest members. As we
have pointed out above, we are mostly inclined to think about cruelty as a crime of
commission. Yet, indiﬀerence to suﬀering can allow us to see it instead as a crime of omission.
According to recentWorld Bank ﬁgures (2015), roughly 10% of the global population lives
in severe poverty. More speciﬁcally, the data suggests that circa 736 million people globally
live below the $1.90 per day international poverty line, characterized by World Bank as
extreme poverty. Even taking this data at face value, one is bound to be struck by the sheer
4Hardimon uses the expression ‘social theodicy’ but we believe that nothing hangs on this diﬀerence, at least, not for
the purposes of the argument laid out in our text.
5Parts of this section are adapted from Held and Maﬀettone, Inequality and Global Justice, forthcoming.
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magnitude of the implied human suﬀering. Yet, thinking about what the data means for
a moment longer makes for an even more morally depressing experience for two reasons.
First, consider what the international poverty line set by the World Bank actually means.
The $1.90/day poverty line is not an exchange rate value. The Bank is not suggesting that
a person is among the global poor if he or she fails to secure 1.90 U.S. dollars each day. In fact,
the ﬁgure refers to purchasing power parity values (P.P.P. values); that is to say, $1.90/day
refers to the equivalent basket of goods one could buy in the US with $1.90. The reason for
using P.P.P. values is that we are typically interested in what people can actually consume
through their income. The P.P.P. exchange rate is the exchange rate which allows for
approximately the same bundle of goods and services to be purchased in all countries of
the world. For poor countries, P.P.P. exchange rates will tend to be smaller than the market
exchange rates, reﬂecting lower price levels in those countries (Milanovic 2016, 15).
Second, consider what the international poverty line and the related headcount of the
world’s poor cannot tell us. The data we highlight are, in some sense, static. They oﬀer
a snapshot of how many people are poor at any given point in time. Even when the World
Bank provides trends concerning the evolution of global poverty numbers over several years,
it simply oﬀers a comparison between two static pictures. Yet what the data simply cannot tell
us is howmany people have been poor as a percentage of the global population at any point in
time over the course of their lives. This is important as it clearly would aﬀect our judgement of
the problem to know that, for example, while 10% of the global population lives in absolute
poverty today, 20% as opposed to 30% or 50% of the world’s population is likely to have
experienced severe poverty over the course of their lives. This is because, in the end, when we
judge the global economic order, we care not only about howmany people can be lifted out of
poverty at a certain point in time, but also about how precarious their lives are and what their
chances are of experiencing extreme poverty. Put diﬀerently, not being deprived, in our
judgement, does not simply entail being able to consume certain things at a certain point in
time, but also to feel secure over the life cycle.
The aforementioned data is a useful reminder of what human life can be like in the world
as it is. Note, though, that poverty, more precisely absolute poverty, is a condition, not
a relationship. Anyone can be (absolutely) poor in splendid isolation. Instead, cruelty is
a relationship. We need more than one agent for cruelty to occur. So, in order to claim that
the global economic order is cruel, we need to say something about the condition of those
who are not absolutely poor. And part of the reason we have to care about global inequalities
in wealth and income is that they reassure us, so to speak, that we are not strictly speaking
unable to help those who have less (see Scanlon, 2018). Put diﬀerently, how far basic rights to
subsistence can be upheld will depend, in our view, on whether the global economic order is
aﬄuent enough to make the protection of these rights against standard social threats
a plausible endeavour.
According to the 2018 World Inequality Report (WIR, 2018), the income share of the
global top 1% has risen from 16% of global income to over 20% of global income since 1980.
Within the same timeframe, the income share of the poorest 50% of the global income
distribution has remained stable at about 9% (WIR 2018, 7). The ﬁgures are even starker
when it comes to global wealth distribution given that ‘the world’s top 1%wealthiest people
increased from 28% to 33%, while the share commanded by the bottom 75% oscillated
around 10% between 1980 and 2016’ (World Inequality Lab 2018, 13). And, if recent trends
continue, the ‘[t]op 1% global wealth share would reach 39% by 2050, while the top 0.1%
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wealth owners would own nearly as much wealth (26%) as the middle class (27%)’ (World
Inequality Lab 2018: ﬁgure, 9). In a nutshell, global inequality data oﬀers ample empirical
reassurance that, bluntly put, humanity can aﬀord to save and protect the insecure and
destitute. One possible conclusion we can draw is that not doing so is a matter of
indiﬀerence with respect to the live prospects of the very poor.
Somewould argue thatﬁvedecades of international aid andassistance provide clear evidence
that indiﬀerence is not the issue (SeeDeaton2013;Duﬂo andBanerjee, 2011; Easterly 2007).We
would disagree, for the real question is notwhether anyone has tried to alter the condition of the
global poor. What one should ask is how far such a goal has featured as a priority in global
political deliberations and decision-making. Indiﬀerence can come in degrees, and the more
what we witness is morally outrageous, themore we are required to prioritize our response to it
in order not to be accused of being indiﬀerent to its consequences. The real question, then, is not
whether helping the poor has been attempted. Rather, it is whether it has been given the
appropriate kind of priority in our moral and political deliberations.
In fact, the very arguments of those who, often correctly, criticize international aid
eﬀorts as ineﬀective and paternalistic reveal that the real issue we face is that the political
costs of addressing global poverty are considered too high, not that we are, strictly speaking,
unable to aﬀect outcomes. For if we believe that institutions and market incentives rather
than redistributive measures are all important, then we are bound to ask why eﬀorts aimed
at following those prescriptions to their logical conclusions have not been prioritized. To
oﬀer just a few examples, consider the following issues. The resource curse still plagues
many poor countries in the world, yet, as it has been authoritatively argued by Leif Wenar
(2016), the resource curse is a violation of basic property rights (and those rights are central
to the functioning of any market). The borrowing privileges of callous governments pile up
debts for future generations (see Pogge 2008) to repay with no clear gains in the present for
the average citizens of their countries, yet eﬃciency would suggest that at least some debts
be forgiven and that lenders themselves avoid moral hazard. The global trading system is
often skewed towards the interest of the wealthy. It excessively protects intellectual property
rights, thus stiﬂing innovation and technology transfers to developing countries and shields
the agricultural sector of developed countries from competition by imposing tariﬀs (See
Stiglitz and Carlton, 2007). Yet the one thing that most economists agree upon is that free
trade should be the norm (see Krugman, Melitz, and Obstfeld 2018). In a world where
capital moves freely almost everywhere, we still have very restrictive immigration policies
that decrease global welfare, and especially the welfare of poor immigrants (Rodrik 2017).
The list could go on (see Held and Maﬀettone 2016). What all these issues have in
common is that they are deeply institutional in nature. Altering them requires time and
patience, and is politically diﬃcult. Yet, and this is the upshot of our discussion, the
case for decisive change is pressing, and is not going to require unreasonable levels of
sacriﬁce by those who stand to lose as a result of these changes.
Conclusion
Immanuel Kant once wrote that ‘If justice perishes, then it is no longer worthwhile for men
to live upon the earth’ (Kant, 1996, Rechtslehre, remark E following paragraph 49). Perhaps
a better way to capture our predicament in global politics today is to say that if decency is
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not urgently achieved, then there might be no coming back from themoral loss incurred by
humankind. In a critical and dark tone Adorno wrote:
‘‘Universal history must be construed and denied. After the catastrophes that have
happened, and in view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that
a plan for a better world is manifested in history and unites it. Not to be denied for that
reason, however, is the unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered
moments and phases of history – the unity of the control of nature, progressing to rule
over men, and ﬁnally to that over men’s inner nature. No universal history leads from
savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton
bomb’’ (1973, 320).
The only way in which history can be conceived, he says, is negatively. Having noted that,
and while recognizing the force of the argument, the emphasis of our argument is
diﬀerent in important respects. It is hard to deny that if poverty and destitution were
a thing of the past, global politics could begin to claim a progressive mantle. Establishing
common standards of decency provides the means to specify the elements that the global
order must display if all human beings are to be free of the appalling conditions that, all
too often today, rob them of their basic rights and, ultimately, of their lives. Until then, as
Adorno rightly argued, ‘the need to let suﬀering speak is a condition of all truth. For
suﬀering is objectivity that weighs upon the subject … ’ (1973, 17–18). Philosophy must
not rest before ‘wretched existence’, and before indecency is brought to an end in all its
forms. Once the struggle for decency is over, the struggle for justice can of course begin.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Rainer Forst, Christopher Finlay, Eva Maria Nag, and
Sebastiano Maﬀettone for comments at diﬀerent stages of the writing process.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Adorno, T. W. 1973. Negative Dialectics. New York: Seabury Press.
Banerjee, A. V., and E. Duﬂo. 2011. Poor Economics. New York: Public Aﬀairs.
Carter, I. 2011. “Respect and the Basis of Equality.” Ethics 121 (3): 538–571. University of
Chicago Press: Chicago. doi:10.1086/658897.
Charlton, A., and J. E. Stiglitz. 2007. Fair Trade for All. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Christiano, T. 2008. The Constitution of Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coakley, M., and P. Maﬀettone. 2016. “Classifying States.” Ethics and Global Politics 10 (1):
58–76. Oxford University Pres: Oxford. doi:10.1080/16544951.2017.1341793.
Deaton, A. 2013. The Great Escape: Health, Wealth and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton, N.J:
Princeton University Press.
Doyle, M. W. 2006. “One World, Many Peoples: International Justice in John Rawls’s the Law of
Peoples.” Perspectives on Politics 4 (1): 109–120. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
doi:10.1017/S1537592706060117.
Dworkin, R. 1983. “Comment on Narveson: In Defense of Equality.” Social Philosophy and Policy
1: 24–40. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. doi:10.1017/S0265052500003307.
30 D. HELD AND P. MAFFETTONE
Dworkin, R. 1986. Law’s Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Easterly, W. 2007. The White Man’s Burden. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feinberg, J. 1973. Social Philosophy. London: Pearson.
Forst, R. 2017. “Political Liberalism: A Kantian View.” Ethics 128 (1): 123–144. University of
Chicago Press: Chicago. doi:10.1086/692945.
Forst, R. 2018. “Human Rights in Context: A Comment on Sangiovanni.” In Human Rights:
Moral or Political, edited by A. Etinson, 200–208. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Freyenhagen, F. 2013. Adorno’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Griﬃn, J. 2008. On Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hardimon, M. O. 1994. Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Held, D. 1980. Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. London: Hutchinson.
Held, D., and P. Maﬀettone. 2016. Global Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity.
James, A. 2005. “Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls Ad the Status Quo.” Philosophy
& Public Aﬀairs 33 (3): 281–316. Wiley: Hoboken. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00034.x.
Kant, I. 1996. The Metaphysics of Morals, M. Gregor, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Krugman, P. R., M. Melitz, and M. Obstfeld. 2018. International Economics: Theory and Policy.
London: Pearson.
Kukathas, C. 2018. “New Perspectives on Distributive Justice: Deep Disagreements, Pluralism,
and the Problem of Consensus.” In Justicitis, edited by M. Knoll, N. Şimsek, and S. Snyder,
187–204. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Lambert, Z. 2015. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [online] T. W. Adorno and
E. N. Zalta, ed. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/adorno/
Linklater, A. 2007. Critical Theory and World Politics. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge.
Margalit, A. 1998. The Decent Society, trans. Goldblum N. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mason, E. 2018. “Value Pluralism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
E. N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/value-pluralism/
Milanovic, B. 2016. Global Inequality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peter, F. 2008. Democratic Legitimacy. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge.
Pogge, T. 2008. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity.
Rawls, J. [1971] 1999. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rodrik, D. 2017. “Is Global Economy the Enemy of National Equality.” [online], https://drodrik.
scholar.harvard.edu/publications/global-equality-enemy-national-equality
Sangiovanni, A. 2017. Humanity Without Dignity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T M. (2018), Why Does Inequality Matter?, Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/
9780198812692.001.0001
Shklar, J. 1982. Putting Cruelty First [online], Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://www.jstor.org/
stable/20024800?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Shklar, J. 1989. The liberalism of fear. [online], Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
https://philpapers.org/archive/SHKTLO.pdf
Shue, H. 1996. Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Simmons, A. J. 2001. Justiﬁcation and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Singer, P. 1979. Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tomasi, J. 2001. Liberalism beyond Justice: Citizen, Society, and the Boundaries of Political
Theory. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Wenar, L. 2016. Blood Oil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, B. 1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
World Bank. 2015. Annual Report 2015. [online] http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-
report-2015
World Inequality Lab. 2018. World Inequality Report. [online], https://wir2018.wid.world/ﬁles/
download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf
ETHICS & GLOBAL POLITICS 31
